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Planning to fail? A critique of current project definitions as a basis for benefit 
realisation 
 
Summary: This paper explores the notion that current project definitions provide a singular 
view: that of project managers and this perspective leads to limited boundaries which are 
prejudicial to good project delivery. Thus, it takes a radically different view of project failure 
from that which is generally accepted. 
We will contend that viewing projects through this limiting lens often results in failure being 
attributed to reasons that are only symptomatic, and that root causes are not uncovered. The 
paper establishes that project failure is endemic and has existed for over 25 years. Attempts to 
apply control and prescriptive methodologies have made the position worse.  
We go on to describe an appreciative research project that uses a definition of projects 
emphasising the realisation of benefits, rather than production of outputs. We then give an 
overview of the success this has achieved so far. We conclude by making some proposals for 
further research. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper discusses an appreciative perspective on research into ways of improving project 
performance, conducted in a United Kingdom (UK) unitary local authority. It will set out the 
reasons for the research, the underpinning principles and the theses being proposed.  
We will begin by examining the three most influential definitions of the project concept 
applied in the UK, suggesting that these lead to inappropriate behaviours, poor decision 
making and ultimately to projects that fail to deliver the benefits desired. Some of the reasons 
put forward for project failure by leading authorities will then be examined. We suggest that 
these views are seen through the singular lens shaped by these definitions, so that the real 
causes of project failure are masked. In consequence, all attempts to improve project 
performance come to nothing, as the solutions are applied to the wrong explanations and the 
underlying causes are left untouched. 
The paper will propose that current approaches to project performance are dualistic in nature, 
utilising prescriptive methodologies based on the three definitions mentioned above, and the 
authors propose a different, pluralistic approach and describe the successful impact such an 
approach had on the organisation the subject of this research. 
This work has been informed by Systems Thinking, drawing on work by Checkland and 
Holwell (1998); Stowell (2009, 2013); Winter and Smith (2006). An approach of action 
research was adopted, combined with engaged scholarship (Van de Ven, 2007). 
 
Project definitions 
 
This section examines the three most influential definitions of ‘project’ utilised in the UK, 
and shows that they are written primarily by project managers. Unsurprisingly, the definitions 
reflect this singular viewpoint. We propose that this singularity leads to a very narrow 
approach, with a limiting boundary focussed on delivering an output to specified parameters 
(usually cost and time). In the following section we further suggest that this limiting 
boundary is a factor in the failure of projects to deliver the benefits for which they were 
commissioned.   
The three most influential definitions utilised in the UK are those from PRINCE2, the Project 
Management Institute (PMI), and the Association for Project Management (APM). We 
examine each of these in turn in more detail below. 
PRINCE2 is a methodology first developed as PROMPT by the UK Government in 1986, in 
an effort to stem the very high rate of project failure it was experiencing. PRINCE is an 
acronym for PRojects IN Controlled Environments. The methodology was last refreshed in 
2009, and the authors of all versions were project managers. That this approach is 
fundamentally flawed is evidenced by the significant failures of UK Government projects 
such as the National Health Service (NHS) IT project (Public Service, 2011); a new Air 
Control Centre, (BBC, 2002); a back office service for the Research Councils, (eGov 
monitor, 2011); and more recently the e-borders project, which was scrapped at considerable 
cost (Glick, 2014). This is just a small sample of failed Government projects and it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to detail every such failure. Further details can be found from National 
Audit Office (2010), Calleam Consulting Ltd. (2014) The Standish Group (2009) and Shore 
(2009).  
The PRINCE2 definition of a project is as follows: 
“A project is a temporary organisation that is created for the purpose of delivering 
one or more business products according to an agreed Business case.”  
  (Office of Government Commerce, 2009) 
This definition forces a focus onto the delivery of products – outputs - with no consideration 
of benefits. The insistence on delivering to an agreed business case, in practice cost, time and 
quality – two best guesses and a phenomenon according to Atkinson (1999), introduces a 
further narrowing of the boundary drawn around projects (Ulrich, 2005).  
Figure 1 shows how the definition of a PRINCE2 project is only a small part of the totality of 
a project and limits the boundary. PRINCE2 explicitly excludes feasibility from the project, 
although it does suggest a project may be commissioned to carry out feasibility. (Office of 
Government Commerce, 2009, p. 6) 
 
Figure 1 Where the PRINCE2 definition of a project positions in the project lifecycle. 
 
The next definition we examine is that offered by the Project Management Institute (PMI). 
This is the largest project management association in the world. It has a global presence, 
although it is based in the United States of America where it was founded in 1969. Both  
Lenfle and Loch (2010); and Morris (2013) contend that Robert McNamara, who became the 
USA Secretary of Defense in 1961, significantly influenced the way project management, and 
the PMI, developed the control and prescriptive processes of projects. This singular 
viewpoint is still prevalent today, especially in government projects. The following is the 
PMI definition of a project: 
 “A project is a temporary endeavour undertaken to produce a unique product, 
service or result.”  
   Project Management Institute (PMI, 2008) 
This definition again applies a very narrow boundary, and is clearly describing an output as 
the end point of a project, with no consideration of benefits realisation for the commissioning 
organisation. The Body of Knowledge produced by the PMI further strengthens this narrow 
viewpoint by detailing processes and tools that concentrate on the delivery of an output rather 
than the realisation of benefits. 
These two definitions are very similar and are very focussed on the production of outputs. As 
Figure 1 shows, this is only a fractional part of the whole product. 
The Association for Project Management was established in 1974 and is affiliated to the 
International Project Management Association (IPMA) - the first project management 
association to be formed, in 1965. The APM is UK based and has recently gained chartered 
status from the UK government; a status which will undoubtedly increase its global influence 
over the next few years. It offers the following definition: 
“A unique, transient endeavour undertaken to achieve planned objectives.”  
  Association of Project Management (APM, 2014) 
This definition is broader than the following two and suggests that projects are intended to 
achieve objectives. However, these may be interpreted broadly, i.e.as business objectives, or 
more narrowly, i.e. as focussing in on outputs. 
These definitions are produced by project managers and do not take into account any other 
perspectives. The definitions are similar, fundamentally defining projects in terms of an 
output delivered to targets. These definitions become the lens through which projects are 
viewed, managed and measured and lead to a singular viewpoint which adherents claim to be 
correct, with any other viewpoint therefore being wrong. A further issue with these 
definitions is that they describe projects as single entities, e.g. ‘we manage a project’; 
whereas in reality any project will be comprised of a number of activities carried out by a 
number of people. Projects consist of multiple activities and actors, which are subject to 
interdependencies, interrelationships, and interconnectedness between these activities and 
those involved. Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of this systemic viewpoint. The 
narrow boundary and tight focus from the definitions above does not take into account the 
diversity of these activities. In addition, judgements of project success and failure are shaped 
by these definitions. This leads to poor understanding of the causes of project failure, and the 
best way to promote project success. These issues will be explored in the next section. 
An alternative more holistic definition is: 
“A project is a temporary organization to which resources are assigned to do work to 
deliver beneficial change.”  
(Turner, 2008, p. 2) 
This definition takes a different stance, one which the authors of PRINCE2 ignored in their 
2009 refresh, and which places the emphasis on realising benefits rather than on outputs - a 
significant change of worldview. Turner’s definition considers that the true purpose of any 
project is to deliver beneficial change, not simply an output such as product or service. The 
research project reported here defines projects thus: 
“Projects are defined as a temporary endeavour comprising activities with resource 
constraints with the purpose of realising benefits.” 
(Summers, 2008, p. 5) 
In applying this definition to the subject organisation, the emphasis was on the purpose of 
achieving benefits and suggests that a project comprises multiple activities and is subject to 
resource constraints. The concept of projects being commissioned to realise benefits was 
introduced into the organisation and re-iterated through the model which was implemented in 
the subject organisation. Figure 2 shows the dynamic of project delivery with the realisation 
of benefits as the purpose. 
 
Figure 2 Benefits as the driver of projects. 
 
Project failure 
We examine three investigations into project failure: those by The Standish Group who 
produce the Chaos Report; Nelson’s retrospectives at the University of West Virginia; and 
Flyvbjerg et. al and their review of mega projects. These authors suggest a commonality of 
reasons and we posit these are suggested from a singular, rather than pluralistic view, through 
the lens of the project definitions given in the preceding section from project managers, rather 
than the executives who commission projects. 
The reasons put forward for project failure are common across all three of these writings and 
recently, in his blog, Rosenhead iterated these reasons (Rosenhead, 2014). This commonality 
is notwithstanding the fact that these findings span 20 years from The CHAOS report in 1995 
to Rosenhead’s findings based upon the people whom he was teaching who represented five 
different countries (Flyvbjerg, 2005, 2014; Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 2003; 
Flyvbjerg, Garbuio, & Lovallo, 2009; Nelson, 2005, 2007; The Standish Group, 1996, 1999, 
2009, 2013). 
The reasons given for project failure are as follows: 
1. Poor planning 
2. Lack of senior management support 
3. Unclear objectives 
4. Poor risk management 
5. Competing priorities 
6. Too many projects 
7. Failing to engage effectively with stakeholders & lack of engagement by stakeholders 
We contend that this is little more than a shopping list of symptoms caused by a rigid and 
tight focus on delivering an output to cost and time. As a result of this focus, other activities 
do not receive the amount of time and energy they need; so stakeholders are ignored, 
planning is skipped and risks are dealt with only when they become issues.  
It can also be seen that this list is viewed through the lens of a project manager e.g. the 
claimed lack of senior management support. It seems unlikely that the executives, who 
commissioned the project, expecting their business to be transformed, would refuse to 
support the project manager. Those authors listed and others in producing these lists do not 
ask: “Why is planning poor? What are the conditions which are causing ineffective 
engagement with stakeholders?” There are many other questions which need to be asked and 
answered in order to really understand the totality of project failure.  
Another factor which is unhelpful in this shopping list approach is the suggestion that each of 
the listed items can be dealt with individually, thus leading to project success. The reasons 
given in the lists are actually interconnected and interrelated and cannot be dissolved in 
isolation, are multicausal and vary in their impact and effect.  (Bignell & Fortune, 1984, p. 8) 
Dealing with project failure in this piecemeal fashion inevitably leads to continued failure, as 
has been witnessed. 
(The Standish Group, 2014), in its April newsletter, states that they have conducted a survey 
of the Standish User Research Forum (SURF) members with a single question “What is your 
definition of success?” Six definitions were provided and these, with their percentage scores, 
are shown below: 
1. on-budget,  32% 
2. on-time, 30% 
3. on-target (requirements),  26% 
4. on-goal (organizational strategy), 29% 
5. valuable, 52% 
6. satisfied, 41% 
A total of 309 responses were received and each respondent was allowed up to four votes. 
The percentages reflect that the criterion was cast as one of the four votes. In addition about 
33% of the respondents selected all of the criteria as their definition of success and 15% 
chose on-budget, on-time and on-target; the iron triangle. 
The Standish group then applied the six definitions against the projects in their database and 
found that only 1.2% would be considered successful; whereas if the single definition of on-
budget was the sole criterion then 42% of projects in the database would be considered 
successful. Viewed another way an amazing 98.8% of the projects reviewed have failed, even 
using the on-budget criterion 58% are failures. 
The newsletter concludes by stating “The Standish Group believes that organizations should 
forget the triple constraints and focus on the value of their project portfolio, not individual 
projects.” 
This is a major change of emphasis for The Standish Group, and a more holistic view with a 
clear departure from the Project Management Institute’s position that success should be 
measured by conformance to the triple constraint albeit having taken 20 years to reach this 
conclusion! 
In reviewing these works on project failure we suggest that the thinking is from a singular 
perspective; that of the project manager and with its narrow focus is also reductionist, two 
traps of non-Systems Thinking according to (Reynolds & Holwell, 2010, p. 6).  The Standish 
Group (1996) report Cobb’s Paradox, attributed to Martin Cobb of the Treasury Board of 
Canada Secretariat, which states  
“We know why projects fail, we know how to prevent their failure -- so why do they 
still fail?” 
Cobb was involved in the original CHAOS report produced by The Standish Group, which no 
doubt contributed to his belief that he understood the ‘whys and know-hows’ of project 
failure. This ‘paradox’ is based on assumptions and a lack of understanding of root causes. 
The first assumption is that we know why projects fail. However, as can be seen from above 
this is only at a first level. Reviewing the reasons listed above, it is clear that there is no 
suggestion that we need to understand why there is, for instance, poor planning or unclear 
objectives. It seems that The Standish Group accepted these reasons without repeatedly 
asking ‘why?’ – a question which will assist in ascertaining root causality. Cobb’s second 
assumption is that it is feasible to deal with these reasons, thus preventing project failure. 
Calling Cobb’s statement a paradox bestows upon it a standing it does not deserve nor is it 
true, a condition for a paradox. It assumes that by dealing with symptoms, this will be 
sufficient to dissolve the problem and there is a lack of thinking about the root causes. In his 
statement, Cobb falls into the trap of dogmatism with his singular viewpoint (Reynolds & 
Holwell, 2010, p. 6) and being stuck in the knowers stance. (Hinken, 2005, 2007; Summers, 
2012) The “…working on the basis of a single unquestioning perspective…” leads to a trap 
of non-systemic thinking – dogmatism (Reynolds & Holwell, 2010, p. 6).  This trap of 
dogmatism at best constrains thinking so that it is narrow in focus, or at worst no thinking at 
all, because the actor knows the ‘right’ solution.  
A further issue with the accepted view of project failure is the reductionist thinking that is 
being applied – a further trap of non-systemic thinking according to Reynolds and Holwell 
(2010, p. 6) and focusses on the parts to the exclusion and detriment of the whole 
(Checkland, 1999, p. 45). This reductionism is described by Reynolds and Holwell (2010, p. 
6) as a trap of non-systemic thinking; “avoiding the inevitable interconnectivity between 
variables…”  As Figure 2 makes clear the activities or variables in projects are 
interconnected. 
The main corollary of both traps is no unlearning takes place, so that those who fall into the 
traps rely on acquired knowledge that may be not be appropriate to the problem environment. 
It becomes very easy to rely upon methodologies based on poor definitions believing that 
following these prescriptive routines will guarantee project success despite the huge volume 
of evidence to the contrary.  
Without a deeper investigation, it becomes easy for governments and organisations to 
prescribe methods that only deal with the symptoms of failure to meet cost and time targets. 
Such measures do not address causes, and it is therefore no surprise that expected benefits of 
projects continue to be elusive. Furthermore, this problem has been recognised in the project 
management community for many years. Shenhar, Milosevic, Dvir, and Thamhain (2007, p. 
702) comment: ‘This operational mindset is clearly reflected in the project management 
literature, which has traditionally used time, budget, and performance as the main indicators 
for project success. Any of these measures—or even all taken together—can lead to 
incomplete and misleading assessment.’ 
The authors argue that if the lens is altered to a focus on delivering beneficial change, then 
the lists of reasons become symptoms of a poor and limiting worldview caused by delivering 
an output and pursuing the targets of cost and time. By making these constraints targets 
activities such as risk management, stakeholder engagement, planning and communication 
amongst others become less important and project failure becomes almost inevitable as these 
activities are not given the requisite time and energy. 
Some projects were indeed commissioned to deliver an output; e.g. the Pyramids, the 
Manhattan project to produce an atomic bomb, Polaris missiles etc. Those who commissioned 
the Pyramids probably didn’t consider the cost or how long the construction would take; the 
output was primary. The Manhattan project had time constraints, the atomic bomb had to be 
produced before the Germans achieved something similar, or World War 2 would have a 
much different outcome. Polaris also was about the output. The NASA space programme of 
the 1960s was concerned with getting man on the moon and returning him safely (Kennedy, 
1961) - again the focus is on the output within a given timescale. As projects were totally 
output focussed within the triple constraint of cost, time and quality (Atkinson, 1999), a 
project manager was appointed to deliver the project. The appointee would be given a project 
brief detailing the specifications of the output together with a budget and timescale. Once the 
target output had been achieved the project manager could be released either back to the day 
job or the contractor who supplier the project manager. This model is still in vogue as any 
glance through job sites will reveal. Appointments are for the anticipated duration of the 
project; this creates a problem of loss of focus in the last few weeks of such a contract as well 
as the project manager having no ownership or loyalty other than delivering the output to the 
given parameters. Furthermore, valuable knowledge is lost as a project team breaks up and 
moves on without attempting to reflect over the activities undertaken, or to capture lessons 
learned. (English, 2006) 
At some point, organisations started to ask why projects were being pursued with significant 
cost and time overruns. This led to control mechanisms being put in place and the 
development of PROMPT (the precursor of PRINCE2) around 1987 in the UK. Lenfle and 
Loch (2010); Morris (2013) both provide histories of projects and project management, 
although they disagree over the Manhattan project, with Morris stating that it bears little 
relationship to current project management in that there was an adaptive and flexible 
approach. This is the nub of Lenfle and Loch’s argument; that project management has lost 
its roots in adaptive practice. Notwithstanding the control mechanisms, projects continued to 
fail to produce the expected outcomes and cost and time overruns are commonplace as shown 
in a previous section. Eventually the concept of projects producing beneficial change (Turner, 
2008, p. 2) started to come to the fore and initially programme management was seen as a 
way of ensuring that projects delivered benefits. The Office of Government Commerce 
(OGC) introduced Managing Successful Programmes (MSP). Programmes are considered to 
be groups of projects and business as usual activities linked together to produce a common 
objective. The concept of a role designed to realise benefits, the business change manager, 
was identified and made explicit in the programme methodology. 
This approach was not entirely successful, so Portfolio management made its appearance. 
This approach borrowed from the discipline of finance, in particular investments, so that 
projects and programmes were considered in their entirety across an organisation and 
explicitly linked to strategic objectives. The portfolio approach is recent and immature in 
most organisations. There is now an emphasis on project leadership so project managers are 
now expected to be leaders doing the right thing rather than the thing right. This does require 
that the project leader is involved in determining the projects to be commissioned which is 
often not the case, especially with organisations contracting project managers solely to 
deliver the output. Further initiatives designed to deal with the failure of projects to deliver 
anticipated benefits include strategic project management and organisational project 
management. 
However, the real issue is that at the heart of these initiatives are projects with their limiting 
definition of delivering outputs with a strong focus on cost and time parameters. Is it any 
surprise that organisations including governments are left disappointed with the results from 
their projects and programmes whether portfolio managed or not? This basic model is not fit 
for purpose for organisation’s requirements and expectations in the 21st century. Whitty 
(2013) suggests that the business model is 20 - 30 years out of date. We contend that Whitty 
is being generous; the model is over 50 years old. The desire to gain value from investments 
using a model that was used in the 1960s to put man on the moon, without regard to benefits, 
is no longer appropriate. Furthermore, no amount of control or control mechanisms will alter 
the fact that the basic system is flawed. As (Morris, 2013, p. 60) states ‘The model of project 
management represented by the PMBOK ® Guide is one essentially of delivery execution: … 
The ethos of the discipline is then to ‘monitor and control’, not to actively shape and drive 
solutions…’  
A projects needs to be viewed as a system to gain a true appreciation of the various elements 
and their properties. In attempting to solve the problem of poor project management, the 
concentration tends to be on either training the project manager in the assumed ‘right’ way to 
conduct activities known as compliance training or increased control over governance. This 
may optimise these parts, but optimisation of a part is likely to lead to sub-optimisation of the 
whole (Deming, 1982, 2000; Machon, 1965; Seddon, 2008). Even by limiting the boundary 
to the project as the system of interest, the optimisation of a single part will lead to sub-
optimisation of the project as a whole, yet the solutions to improve project delivery 
consistently concentrate on a part and ignore the whole. It is therefore small wonder that 
projects continue to fail with such regularity. The approach we advocate considers the whole, 
not just the project elements, and the wider system in which projects were delivered.  
PRINCE2 is a good governance methodology; however, it does not consider the whole 
system of the project nor the bigger organisational context. It also is a methodology born of a 
belief that control is the way to improve project delivery. It stems from an incomplete 
understanding of the real nature of projects and leads to sub-optimisation.  
This limited thinking is also revealed in the way projects are staffed, with project managers 
often being recruited after a brief has been produced and leaving the project on completion of 
output, although it is not unknown for multiple project managers to be employed on single 
projects. 
 
Research methodology 
 
Project performance was considered to be poor within the unitary local authority under 
review, so an exploration of practice in other organisations was undertaken. At the same time, 
a review of the literature on projects was conducted, focussing especially on reasons for 
failure as discussed above. This research was concerned with identifying reasons for poor 
project performance in the Council, designing a model to improve project performance, then 
implementing this model and finally evaluating the results from this intervention. The 
research was designed to answer the following questions; 
1. What impact would a systemic approach have on project performance? 
2. What impact would with an emphasis on education, rather than one based on 
control processes and compliance training, have on project performance? 
3. What impact would a programme based on active learning have on the 
performance of attendees on such a programme?  
The model introduced into the Council, with its three elements, served both as a means to 
improve practice and to learn more about ways of improving practice. Thus the model serves 
as both an epistemological and ontological device, being a method for discerning knowledge 
and applying knowledge, or double-loop learning as Arygris and Schön (1974) have 
expressed it. The three elements comprised  
1. Governance based upon PRINCE2 
2. A learning and development programme 
3. A community of practice 
As illustrated in Figure 3. 
 Figure 3 Model introduced into council 
A Systems Thinking approach based on Vickers’ concept of appreciation was used 
throughout. Vickers (1968, p. 130) writes of an appreciative system as a continual process of 
learning which he believes has three phases, “information, valuation and action.”  Reflection 
on existing practices was followed by action, which yielded new information. This, in turn, 
was reflected upon before further action for improvement was taken. Throughout the period 
of inquiry, the researcher reflected upon the problem and the reactions by people across the 
organisation, together with data from external sources (e.g. experiences of other organisations 
or articles and books, both academic and practitioner-based). In carrying out this research, an 
approach based in Systems Thinking was adopted and so followed recommendations from 
Checkland and Holwell (1998); Stowell (2009, 2013); Winter and Smith (2006). This 
approach included action research combined with engaged scholarship. Systems Thinking is 
capable of yielding insights into the nature of the phenomena examined, and also methods of 
understanding this phenomenon (Van de Ven, 2007, p. 36) and additionally enables inquirers 
to consider different perspectives on the phenomena, giving a fuller picture to support 
problem dissolving.   
(Van de Ven, 2007, p. ix) defines engaged scholarship as ‘… a participative form of research 
for obtaining the advice and perspectives of key stakeholders (researchers, users, clients, 
sponsors and practitioners) to understand a complex social problem.’  He argues that 
engaged scholarship produces richer knowledge than if just the single researcher were 
involved in the research. In taking this approach, the different perspectives of the actors 
involved in projects were accommodated and a more systemic definition introduced into the 
organisation. This approach also allowed for projects to be viewed in a pluralistic way; that is 
taking more than one perspective. Different actors will expect different results from projects, 
and so it is necessary to go beyond a singular view from the project manager, strongly 
influenced by the project definitions examined previously. 
Figure 4 shows Van de Ven’s diamond model of engaged scholarship.  
Governance
Learning & 
development 
programme
Community 
of practice
  
Figure 4 Engaged scholarship diamond model adapted from (Van de Ven, 2007, p. 10) 
This model shows the four stages and the interactions discretely, but in practice my 
discussions with the stakeholders went across these boundaries. For example, in discussing 
the problem the Council faced with the tier 1 and tier 2 managers, some offered their own 
solutions to the problem. In order to design an intervention and the components it is 
necessary to gain an understanding (Bignell & Fortune, 1984, p. 157); an appreciation of the 
system of interest (Stowell & Welch, 2012). All of the input needed to be reflected upon to 
gain a full appreciation of the factors impacting upon the systems. The research did engage 
with interested parties; albeit more in the theory building, problem formulation and problem 
solving domain than the research design one. This approach provided a pluralistic approach 
to the problem domain providing a broad view of the system of interest.  
Action research was chosen as the research approach due to its systemic nature, and the fact 
that the researcher was actively involved in the whole intervention as facilitator in the 
learning and development programme in addition to responsibility for project performance 
within the organisation. Action research is an approach which combines action and research 
in a collaborative, iterative, and emergent inquiry process (Holian & Coghlan, 2013, p. 400); 
(Saunders, Thornhill, & Lewis, 2012, p. 183) which links well with  Vickers (1968, p. 130) 
description of an ‘Appreciative System as a continual process of learning’. 
Action research also places an emphasis on practical outcomes (Bryman, 2012, p. 393) and 
developing solutions to problems (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 183) and this research is 
concerned with practice and dissolving poor project performance. 
In his 1946 paper Lewin writes of action research  
‘…a comparative research on the conditions and effects of various forms of social 
action and research leading to social action’ (Lewin, 1946, p. 35)  
He also considers this research method 
 ‘…a spiral of steps, each of which is composed of a circle of planning, action, and 
fact-finding about the result of the action’ (Lewin, 1946, p. 37)  
Which is similar to Vickers’ appreciative system of learning and its iteration of information-
valuation-action and was applied throughout this research 
 
Research results 
 
This research was conducted over a period of five years. Throughout that period, the 
emphasis was placed on the purpose of projects as delivering benefits, and not simply a 
defined output. Benefits realisation was at the very heart of projects and every document, 
project board meeting and workshop emphasised this as the purpose. (Summers, 2011). 
Project management within the organisation had been rated as poor by the Audit Commission 
in 2004, and consequently subject to annual reviews. Within two years of the start of this 
intervention, the Audit Commission was satisfied with the improvement and no longer 
conducted annual reviews. In the first six months a project was cancelled because the benefits 
expected did not justify the cost and effort, and this saved in excess of £4 million which could 
be better invested. Interestingly this would constitute a failure based on the criteria used by 
The Standish Group. Projects were subject to evaluation reports with the benefits and their 
measures determined before the project had expended too much resource and increasingly 
projects delivered against these reports. Interestingly, 90% of projects commissioned and 
finished within this five year period did not exceed the cost and time constraints imposed 
upon them. This is in marked contrast to projects which focus on the twin targets of cost and 
time; we reflect that, as a Ugandan proverb says:    
‘He who hunts two rats, catches none’ (Special Dictionary, 2005). 
The UK Government through its Major Projects Authority (MPA) actually lists six criteria to 
establish project success; (Steel, Summersgill, & Band, 2010) which is unlikely as The 
Standish Group have shown with 98.8% of the projects in their database failing against six 
similar criteria. (The Standish Group, 2014).This paper is concentrating on the improvement 
shown in project delivery however the research also suggested that a learning programme 
which concentrated on facilitating learners understanding of the necessary activities to deliver 
a whole life project would produce an improvement in performance. This performance 
improvement was not limited to project delivery; the learning impacted all of their work 
activities (Summers, 2013). This element of the research is beyond the scope of this current 
paper. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Projects are not commissioned to deliver an output to specified constraints despite the 
definitions examined earlier; they are commissioned to deliver beneficial change to the 
organisation and it is important to clarify the purpose of the project. Gaining clarity of 
purpose is an important principle, not just in terms of projects, but also other activities such 
as designing degree courses and units, learning activities and corporate strategies inter alia. 
The purpose of projects is to deliver benefits to the organisation, usually monetary or capable 
of being expressed in monetary terms. Sometimes, however, the benefits are intangible, e.g. 
improvement in staff morale or the reputation of the organisation. 
The definitions of projects examined above are viewed from the perspective of project 
managers, yet it is the business managers who commission projects. We suggest that it is they 
who should be defining projects, in conjunction with other engaged actors, including staff 
and customers, whose contextual understandings may be crucial. A systemic perspective will 
produce improved return on investment, as demonstrated in the research undertaken in the 
subject organisation. There needs to be challenge to the current project definitions to enable 
more relevant definitions to become accepted. In addition, a level of unlearning and 
relearning will be required so that business managers can take ownership of projects and the 
realisation of benefits.  
In this research there were three iterations of a development programme and other standalone 
workshops delivered. The principal researcher assisted in the facilitation of around 85% of 
these workshops, and in this way helped to embed the concept of benefits delivery as the 
reason for commissioning projects. The intervention was a systemic approach using top 
down, the governance process; bottom up, the learning activities; and left field, the 
community of practice. Figure 5 shows this graphically: 
  
Figure 5 Systemic nature of the intervention 
This exploration of project failure, and the reasons listed, demonstrates the singular 
perspective of project definitions and project managers and does not allow for the whole of a 
project lifecycle, nor indeed are the real root causes of failure exposed. The reasons put 
forward are superficial, being symptoms of a project definition focussed on delivering an 
output, to the twin targets of cost and time. 
We contend that the current definitions of projects are dogmatic and reductionist, as explored 
in this paper. A radical change of viewpoint is required if projects are ever to fully deliver the 
return on investment organisations are expecting. The research described suggests that a 
better way forward is achievable. However, the authors are aware that this work has only 
been conducted in one specific organisation and so the results are not generalizable. Further 
research needs to be conducted in other organisations, applying the model with its emphasis 
on benefits and learning. Another avenue of research is to ascertain from business managers 
whether they feel the current definitions of projects are appropriate and, if not, what 
definitions they would prefer. 
This further research has the potential to improve the return on investment in projects 
significantly and change 50 years’ experience of failure into more positive future outcomes 
for organisations. Additionally, if further research supports our contentions, then approaches 
to project education will be materially altered to place emphasis on clarification of purpose, 
and gaining an understanding and mastery of the activities needed to deliver project success. 
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